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The Effect of NAFTA on Mexican Agricultural
Exports to the United States:
The Case of Coffee Beans, 1970-2003
Mario M. Carrillo-Huerta*
Universidad de las Americas-Puebla
and
Israel Minor Bonilla**
Universidad de las Americas-Puebla
Since its implementation in 1994, NAFTA’s impacts on trade have been extensively and
positively evaluated at an aggregate level, but not so much at a regional or sectorial level.
Through time series analysis, this paper studies NAFTA’s impact on Mexican exports of coffee
beans to the U. S. The study shows a NAFTA’s positive, although short-lasting effect (for twothree years) on the studied variable, mainly because the international market of coffee beans
used to function on a quota system, thus preventing Mexico from capitalizing (and furthering)
on the comparative advantage derived from its location, close to the U.S. market.
I.
Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) sparked a strong debate in Mexico about
the costs and benefits associated with trade liberalization even before it was implement in 1994.
Ten years later, there are still mixed opinions about the impact of NAFTA on Mexican
development. Leycegui (2000)1, for instance, argues that “…for Mexico, it is the most
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important economic policy decision for the last fifty years…(since)…it would help this country
to become more efficient in its productive processes and therefore more competitive, which at
the end will mean greater wealth and opportunities for the Mexican population”. Others believe
that NAFTA has not only not been able to match the expectations in terms of growth of
Mexican exports, but also that it has deepened regional and sectorial disparities in the country.
It promotes development only in a few regions and sectors, making it hard for other regions and
sectors to catch up. (Delgadillo, 2004; Corona, 2003).
In fact, a simple view of the evolution of Mexico’s foreign trade since 1994 shows a
significant growth of trade with the United States. As the data included in Table I shows,
Mexico´s balance of trade with the United States improved. A deficit was turned into a surplus
during the 1994-2003 period as the balance of trade grew consistently from U. S. dollars 3,145.4 million in 1994, to + 36,399.3 million in 2003.
However, when the abovementioned development of Mexico-U. S. agricultural trade is
evaluated, it is clear that NAFTA’s impact has not been so strong, nor has it been so beneficial
for México. Table II shows that during the period 1993-1998, Mexico’s agricultural balance of
trade with the U.S. became positive only in 1995 (one year after the implementation of
NAFTA), and even then Mexican imports have grown faster than exports.
This paper focuses on the analysis of the change in Mexican exports of coffee beans to
the United States during the period 1970-2003, with the help of time series analysis. The main
reasons for selecting coffee beans for this analysis are: 1) coffee beans traditionally have been
the single most important agricultural product in terms of the aggregate value of Mexican
exports of coffee beans to the U.S.; 2) up to 1989, the international market of coffee beans had
operated through a quota system imposed on producers by International Agreements. This did
not allow countries to benefit from the comparative advantages (in terms of cost of production)
associated with location.2 The paper has been divided into four sections. Section II includes a
discussion of the recent changes in the aggregate value of Mexican exports of coffee beans and
comments on the functioning of the international market for the product. In section III, three
studies of the impact of NAFTA on Mexican coffee bean exports to the U. S. are discussed.
This section also includes the description of the econometric model used in this paper. Section
IV, concludes by presenting the final results of this study.
II.
The International Market for Coffee Beans and the Mexican Exports to the United
States
For a long period of time, the international market for coffee beans was guided by
International Agreements between producers, which determined a quota system for exports
from participating countries. In fact, prices and volume of exports of coffee beans have rarely
been determined by the free play of market forces, as the instability of the market forces meant
that in a free market the coffee bean prices would fluctuations wildly. According to Renard
(1993), the chief aim of the International Coffee Organization behind regulating the market
through a quota system was to stabilize coffee beans prices. This was achieved by controlling
the quantity of coffee beans supplied into the market, and for that, ICO used different indicators
in different Agreements.3
2

In 1997, when Mexican agricultural exports to the U. S. amounted to U.S. dollars 3,388.5, exports of coffee
beans to that country amounted to U. S. dollars 557.7 million, representing around 16.5% of the total, followed by
fresh (and refrigerated) tomatoes, which amounted to U.S. dollars 519.4 million, or 15.3% of the total, and by malt
liquor (beer), with U.S. dollars 402.4 million, or 11.9% of the total. (Cerro, 2000: 416).
3
The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) grouped producers into four types, according to four varieties of
coffee beans: Colombian softs, other softs (where Mexico is included), non-washed arabica, and robusta.
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By the second semester of 1987, the then current International Coffee Agreement
(which had been signed in 1983) was suspended. With the market now functioning freely,
coffee beans prices went down and there was a significant drop in the value of exports, and
even though the members of the ICO decided to extend the Agreement for one more year, it
was abandoned completely by the second semester of 1989.
After the International Coffee Agreement was abandoned, the producer countries
released their product surpluses into market, and the price of coffee beans dropped
dramatically. According to Renad (1999), fell to 1.10 U.S. dollars per pound by June of 1989,
and further to 0.70 U.S. dollars per pound by October of that year. This price was much below
than that estimated by the producers after the agreement had been abandoned.. Prices continued
to fall between 1989 and 1993 with coffee prices reaching their lowest level in 19924
A.

Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans to the United States
According to the International Coffee Organization, Mexico has traditionally occupied
fourth to sixth place in the list of the most important producers of coffee beans in the world,
with its exports representing 5% to 6% of world output.5 Most of the coffee beans produced in
Mexico are exported, and most of those exports are to the U. S. The data included in Table III,
show that total annual Mexican exports averaged around 200 000 tons during the period 19751999, and that also on the average, around 75% of those exports have gone to the United States
of America.6
III. Analysis of the Impact of NAFTA on Mexican Exports
There are at least three studies of the impact of NAFTA on Mexican exports relevant to
this paper. Malaga, Williams and Fuller (2001) tried to identify the impact of NAFTA on the
Mexican exports of five agricultural products to the United States; Garces (2001) focused at a
more general level by considering total Mexican exports to the U. S.; Ramirez (2004) estimated
the impact by using a type of model used by Garces, but at a more disaggregated level.
A.

The Malaga, Williams and Fuller Model
The main objective of the Malaga, Williams and Fuller (2001) study was to measure the
effect of the liberalization of trade and economic growth on U.S.-Mexico trade, through the
analysis of supply, demand, exports and imports of the following five fresh vegetables:
tomatoes, onions, cucumbers, squash and bell peppers.
The authors considered four factors (namely, growth rate of real wages, the level of
productivity of technology, per capita income, and cyclical movements of the exchange rate
between the Mexican peso and the U. S. dollar) related to different levels of economic
development in Mexico and the United States, that affect the foreign trade of agricultural
products in general, and of fresh vegetables, in particular. Thus, the model tests the behavior of

4

At such low prices, many countries abandoned the production of coffee beans, since the current price did not
cover costs. Moreover, the scaffold for the functioning of the International Coffee Organisation had been the
public Institutes located within the exporting countries; for Mexico, it was the Instituto Mexicano del Café. After
the breaking down of the International Coffee Agreement, such Institutes had no reason to exist and therefore they
were dismantled.
5
The most important producers of coffee beans at the world level are Brasil, with 30%, Colombia with 13%,
Indonesia with 8% and México with 4% of the total exports. The most important importers of the product are the
European Community with 44%, the United States with 24%, and Japan with 7% of the total. (ICO, 2004).
6
It is important to notice that the atypical years both for total exports and for exports to the United States were
1988 (when the lowest figures were reached) and 1989 (when the highest figures were reached). As it was seen
before, this was a direct consequence of the breaking down of ICA.
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the demand and supply functions for the five vegetables in both countries, to determine the
differential impacts of the four aforementioned economic indicators . (Please see Appendix 1
for the specification of the model)
One of the main results of this study is that economic growth is more important than
NAFTA in explaining future changes in the foreign trade of the products considered. The
authors found that NAFTA would be responsible only for changes in future U. S. imports of
bell peppers. Moreover, they concluded that for the 1993-1996 period, the devaluation of the
Mexican peso was the main factor responsible for the growth of U.S. imports of the five
vegetables studied. They also found that the respective U.S. and Mexican rates of production
(yield) influence the U.S. imports of tomatoes, squash and onions more than NAFTA. They
also found that though changes in real income and/or real wage rates, have less impact on U.S.
imports than that of the rate of growth in production, changes in real wage rates still have a
more significant impact than NAFTA.
B.

The Garces Model
Garces (2001) studied the behavior of Mexican total exports and imports within the
NAFTA framework between 1980 and 2000. He stresses the impact of institutional changes in
foreign trade, by analyzing imports and exports separately.7
The author estimated export demand functions, and he found a very stable demand
when it is a function of the index of U. S. industrial production and also a function of the real
exchange rate. In general terms, the author found that the U. S. economic activity has impacted
the Mexican balance of trade most significantly. Also, he found that the depreciation of the
Mexican peso increased trade between the two countries and contributed to Mexico’s surplus of
balance of trade with U.S.
C.

The Ramirez Model
Ramirez (2004) chiefly uses the Garcés model but he disaggregates it to try to explain
the behavior of Mexican textile exports during the 90’s.8
The author calculated short-term elasticities and concluded that Mexico’s textile exports
are most sensitive to changes in the index of U. S. industrial production. He also found that the
aggregate value of China’s textile exports to the U.S. affect the Mexican textile exports to the
U. S. Ramirez also concludes that there is an important inverse relationship between the index
for the real industrial wage rate in Mexico (as compared with China’s) and the value of
Mexican textile exports.9

7

For the case of exports, Garces (2001) uses the following model:
(1)
Log (xt) = ß0 + ß1log(ivpit) + ß2log(tcrt) + ut
where: (xt), indicate mexican exports; (ivpit), is an index for the value of mexican industrial production; (tcrt), is
the real exchange rate.
8
The model used by Ramirez (2004) is as follows:
(2)
Xt= ß0 + ß1ivpit + ß2tcrt + ß3xchinat + ß4istext + ß5ismancht + ut
where: Xt indicate Mexico’s textile exports; ivpit is an index for the U. S. industrial production; tcrt is the real
exchange (Mexican peso-U. S. dollar) rate; xchinat indicate China’s textile exports to the U. S.; istext is an index
for wages in the Mexican textile sector; ismancht is the index of wages in China’s manufacturing industrial sector.
9
The author created some dummy variables for controlling NAFTA’s effects, but they resulted non-significant.
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D.

The Model for the Study of Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans to the United States
The model estimated in this paper is similar to the disaggregated one used by Ramirez
10
(2004). We tried to analyze the effect of NAFTA on Mexican foreign trade by studying the
behavior of the Mexican exports of coffee beans (in kilograms) to the U. S., thus testing the
hypothesis that trade liberalization is beneficial to all participating countries. The tested model
was as follows:
(3)

Ln(x) = ß0 + ß1ln(p) + ß2ln(%cm) + ß3ln(gpc) + ß4ln(ypc) + ß5ln(tcr) +
ß6ln(ismM) + ß7ln(xcomp) + ß8Dummy(ptlcan) + ß9Dummy(tlcan) +
ß10Dummy(dtlcan) + ß11Dummy(ai)

where: ln, refers to the first difference in the natural logarithm of the relevant variables; (x),
indicates Mexican exports of coffee beans to the U. S. (kg); (p), shows the international price of
coffee beans of the “other softs” group; (%cm), is the proportion represented by the
industrialization of coffee beans in the total Mexican manufacturing sector; (gpc), refers to per
capita expenditures on coffee in the U. S; (ypc), indicates U. S. per capita income; (tcr), refers
to the real exchange rate peso/dollar; (ismM), indicates the index of real industrial wages in
Mexico; (xcomp), indicates the exports of coffee beans to the U. S. by other competitors (kg);
Dummy(ptlcan), shows a dummy variable indicating a year prior to NAFTA, which equals 1 in
1993 or before; Dummy(tlcan), indicates the year of NAFTA, and it equals 1 for 1994;
Dummy(dtlcan), indicates a year after NAFTA, and equals 1 in 1995 or after; Dummy(ai),
indicates the year of the dissolution of the Fourth International Coffee Agreement, and equals 1
in 1989.
This model was tested for the period 1970-2003. The data for the exports of coffee
beans by Mexico and by other competitors are expressed in annual growth rates. The
international price of “other softs” coffee beans is also expressed as an annual rate of growth.
The value of the manufacture of coffee beans is also expressed as a percentage of the aggregate
value of the Mexican manufacturing sector. The U.S. per capita expenditure on coffee is also
expressed as an annual rate of growth, as are the U. S. per capita income, the index for
manufacturing real wages in Mexico, and exports from competitors.
There were three dummy variables included into the model to take into account the
impact of NAFTA. The variable dummy(ptlcan) was introduced to analyze the effect of the
anticipated implementation of NAFTA; variable dummy(tlcan) was introduced to see if there
were any changes in the level of exports of coffee beans from one year on after the
implementation of NAFTA; and variable dummy(dtlcan) was introduced to detect any lags on
the impact of NAFTA upon exports of coffee beans.11
10

Is it important to mention that the most appropriate model to study agricultural products is the one used by
Malaga, Williams and Fuller. Nonetheless, such a model can not be used for the case of coffee beans simply
because the U. S. does not cultivate coffee beans and therefore it does not have a supply function, which is
fundamental to that model.
11
The main data used for the volume of exports of coffee beans came from the Mexican annual foreign trade
statistics (INEGI, 2004). The international price series for ‘other softs’ came from Renard (1993) for years 1970 to
1984; for years 1985 to 2003, they came from www.ico.org (the web page for the International Coffee
Organisation). All data referring to the participation of the industrialization of coffee in Mexican manufacturing
came from the Banco de Información Económica (Economic Information Database), BIE, prepared by INEGI
(www.inegi.gob.mx). Also the data series for the index of industrial wage rates came from the BIE. The data on
per capita consumption of coffee in the U. S. came from the World Bank (www.worldbank.org). Data for the real
exchange rate came from the web page of the Banco de Mexico, the Mexican central bank (www.banxico.org.mx).
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E.

Tests for Unitary Roots
As is it well known, a time series model has to be subjected to tests of integration in
order to classify the series as with a stationary tendency, or with stationary differences.
The integration tests applied in the paper are included in Table IV, and they are the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test and also the GLSDF test proposed by
Elliot, et. al. (1996). Those (and other) are used jointly to corroborate the presence of unitary
roots in the time series of data.
The first part of Table IV, shows the test for unitary roots for both the dependent and the
independent variables. One can see from the data shown in Table IV, that Mexican exports of
coffee beans is the only variable for which the unitary roots hypothesis is rejected, with a 5%
level of confidence, by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test; that is, the variance and the
mean are constant through time. Thus, for all the other level series the unitary roots hypothesis
is accepted and therefore one can proceed to calculating differences.
The Phillips-Perron test shows similar results as the variable ‘Mexican exports of coffee
beans’ is the only one for which the unitary roots hypothesis is rejected.
The second part of Table IV shows the results from the calculation of the first
differences in the time series. In this case, the only two variables for which the unitary roots
hypothesis is accepted are the series for the real exchange rate and the series for the index of
the real wage rate within the coffee manufacturing sector. For the rest of the series of data, the
hypothesis of unitary roots on first differences is rejected. This is shown in the coefficients as
their absolute value is below the critical value, both in the Dickey-Fuller test and in the
Phillips-Perron test. It is important at this time to mention that most coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1% confidence level.
The third (last) part of Table IV shows the results from the analysis of second
differences. The second differences show that the unitary roots hypothesis is rejected at a
significance level of 1% for all variables.
F.

Cointegration Analysis
A cointegration analysis was performed to see if a long-run relationship existed among
the variables. The econometric analysis consisted of the consideration of a vector on k nonstationary variables which form a cointegrating system, which could subsequently be
interpreted as a long-run demand function for Mexican exports of coffee beans, which itself
depends on k-1 variables.
In this section, the demand for the Mexican exports of coffee beans is estimated as a
linear function of: the international price of ‘other softs’; the rate of participation (share) of the
coffee industry within the Mexican manufacturing sector; the per capita expenditure on coffee
in the U. S; the rate of per capita income in the U. S; the real exchange rate; the real wage rate
in the coffee sub sector of Mexican manufacturing, and; the rate of exports of coffee beans to
the U. S. by other competitors.
In order to test the cointegration levels among the variables included in the analysis, the
variables in the model were subjected to the Johansen (1988) Test. Thus, a maximum

The data for the exports of coffee beans from other competitors came from the web page of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (www.fao.org).

82

likelihood analysis was run for the variables in the system. The corresponding results are shown
in Table V.
The first part of Table V includes the values of the Max-lambda statistics and the path
for the sequential hypothesis of no-cointegration vectors, at least one vector and three vectors at
the most.
For the first hypothesis, the Max-lambda statistic of 165.55 exceeds the critical value of
52, which leads one to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration. Thus, the second hypothesis
has to be evaluated and it is also rejected because the value of the Max-lambda coefficient is
larger than the critical value. The value of the Max-lambda coefficient of the third hypothesis is
below the critical level and is therefore, not rejected. Thus, it is concluded that there are two
vectors of cointegration; that is, there exist two long-run equilibrium relationships among the
variables considered in the system. Therefore, the coefficients can be interpreted as long-run
elasticities.
The second part of Table V includes the normalized cointegration coefficients (ßcoefficients) and the adjustment of the α-coefficients for the two cointegration vectors of the
variables in the system. Only the first vector will be taken as a reference in order to facilitate
the interpretation of the long-run relationships among the variables. The coefficients have the
correct signs and therefore the estimates from this first vector suggest the following long-run
demand for Mexican exports of coffee beans:
(4)

Ln(x) = c + 35.949ln(p) + 1.18ln(%cm) – 31.226ln(gpc)– 34.002ln(ypc) -4.973ln(tcr) + 10.357ln(ismM) + 32.963ln(xcomp)

The third part of Table V includes the results from the weak exogeneity test. This test is
used to contrast the null hypothesis that one or more variables in the VAR are not included in
the cointegration relationships. Thus, they indicate that none of the variables included in the
cointegration system can be eliminated from the long-run relationships.
IV.

General Results from the Study
Table VI shows the expected impact of the independent variables (which will be
discussed in this section) on the Mexican exports of coffee beans to the U. S. (MECBUS).
One can start with the variable that shows the difference in the natural logarithm of the
international price of ‘other softs’. The results indicate that if the rate of growth of such
international price increases by one percent, the rate of growth of MECBUS will decrease by
5.14 percent.
The next variable indicates that if the growth rate of the participation of the coffee
industry in Mexican manufacturing increases by one percent, the rate of growth of MECBUS
will increase by 0.72 percent.
Also, if the rate of growth of U. S. per capita expenditures on coffee goes up by one
percent, the growth rate of MECBUS will also go up by 4.978 percent.
However, if the rate of growth of the exports from other competitors increases by one
percent, the rate of growth of MECBUS will decrease by 3.187 percent.
In the case of the dummy variables introduced into the model to account for the effects
of NAFTA and the dissolution of the International Coffee Agreement, the three dummies gave
statistically significant results. Thus, the variable that measures the previous effect of NAFTA
is related to an increase in the rate of growth in MECBUS by 0.339 percent. Similarly, the
variable that measures the effect of the presence of NAFTA on the rate of growth in MECBUS
shows an increase of 1.057 percent with respect to the period previous to NAFTA. However,
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the variable which measures the lag effect of NAFTA on the rate of growth of MECBUS shows
a decrease of 1.38 percent.
Variables such as the rate of growth in U. S per capita income; the rate of growth of the
real exchange rate, and the rate of growth in the index of real wages for the Mexican
manufacturing sector, all display inverse relationships with the growth rate of MECBUS. But,
these results were not statistically significant.
Chow test was applied to the regression (shown in Table VI) in order to see if either
NAFTA or any other event caused a structural change in the coefficients of the long-run
relationships between the behavior of MECBUS and the rest of the variables included in the
analysis. The result was an estimated value of 0.686 for the Chow statistic, which was smaller
than the critical value, thus indicating that NAFTA did not modify the value of the coefficients
in the long-run relationships.
Last, Table VII includes the results from the model of the Vector of the Correction of
Errors (VEC), which shows the short-run relationships between the change in the rate of growth
of MECBUS and the independent variables. Those results indicate that an increase in the
growth rate (first difference) of the share of coffee beans within the Mexican manufacturing
sector for the second previous period will have a negative impact on MECBUS of around 1.3%,
and that an increase in the growth rate of the real wage rate index for the Mexican
manufacturing sector for t-2 will have a 1.741% positive impact on MECBUS.
V.

Final Comments
On the basis of the results from the analysis of the Mexican exports of coffee beans to
the United States, one can say that, contrary to what Malaga, Williams y Fuller (2001), Garces
(2001) or Ramirez (2004) found, that in the case of coffee beans, NAFTA had a positive impact
on Mexican exports to the United States of America. However, such an effect lasted only a very
short period of time.
Such a short run positive effect is more likely to have resulted from the peculiar
characteristics of the functioning of the international market for coffee beans. Usually, this
market subjected the coffee producers to a system of quotas and rarely allowed for the market
to determine the price and volume in international trade. In such working terms, the
international market simply did not allow for countries such as Mexico, to capitalize on the
comparative advantage it enjoyed due to its proximity with one of the most important importers
of coffee beans.
With the dissolution of the ICA in 1989 and the implementation of NAFTA in 1994,
Mexico had an opportunity to use its comparative advantage derived from being geographically
close to the United States. However, this did not last for very long. After two-three years,
NAFTA’s positive impact on the Mexican exports of coffee beans to the U.S.A. disappeared.
By then, the international price of coffee beans, the exports of Mexico’s competitors to the U.
S. and the behavior of the U. S. economy had a more significant impact on MECBUS.
In short, combining the results from this study with those from other previous studies,
including the one by Malaga, Williams and Fuller (2001), it can be concluded that although the
NAFTA has played an important role in increasing Mexican exports to the U. S. at an aggregate
level that has not been the case for other agricultural products. For products such as coffee
beans or vegetables, which are supposed to be important sources of foreign exchange, NAFTA
has had little or no positive impact on Mexican exports to the U. S.
One has to recognize that internal factors in Mexico are responsible for the behavior of
Mexico’s agricultural exports sector, as there has not been a well defined policy for promoting
productivity and competitiveness in the primary sector for the last few decades in the country
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(Cerro, 2000). However, as ‘coffee beans’ is one of the few products, where Mexican producers
do not face competition from the U. S. producers, it is evident that NAFTA will not be able to
address the problem of the lack of competitiveness of the Mexican agricultural sector –
contrary to one of the chief arguments supporting the establishment of NAFTA. .12 Thus, while
NAFTA cannot be blamed for the fate of Mexican agricultural exports to the U. S., Leycegui’s
assertion that NAFTA would make the Mexican producers more efficient (and hence more
competitive) cannot be substantiated for the agricultural sector.

12

Other products which are not produced by American farmers include sugar cane and many tropical fruits.
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Table I
Mexico’s Balance of Trade, 1993-2003.
(millions of U.S. dollars)a

Country

a

Total
North
America
U. S. A.
Canada
ALADI
Central
America
European
Union
European
Free Trade
Association
NICS
Japan
Rest of the
World

1994

1995

1996

1997

-18,528.7

7,087.5

6,535.0

428.6

-3,283.2

13,057.4 13,466.4 12,370.6 8,894.3 14,568.0 19,487.6 25,364.4 34,731.5 6,009.2

-3,145.4
-137.8
-826.3

12,444.2 13,037.9 12,182.6 9,665.6 15,125.5 20,151.1 26,529.7 36,399.3 6,140.7
613.1
428.4
188.1
-771.3 -557.5 -663.5 -1,165.3 -667.7 -131.4
1,827.1 2,033.0 1,715.8 653.6
-470.4 -1,127.3 -1,716.4 -2,864.1 -631.2

409.9
-6,252.2
-360.7
-2,509.9
-3,783.0
-1,483.3

633.3

716.8

945.2

1998

1999

2000

7,913.5 -5,583.6 -8,003.0

1,099.6

980.3

1,077.8

2001

2002

2003/p

-9,953.6

-8,136.0

-200.5

1,120.5

861.5

92.0

-3,378.7 -4,230.7 -5,929.7 -7,810.1 -7,540.1 -9,165.0 -10,832.9 -11,223.0 1,794.1
210.6

-85.0

-258.3

-372.1

-321.1

-265.0

-1,326.0 -1,672.7 -2,801.2 -3,397.1 -4,411.3 -6,195.1
-2,972.8 -2,738.7 -3,177.3 -3,685.8 -4,307.0 -5,535.1
-658.9

-437.2

-1,468.4 -2,000.4 -2,430.3 -3,526.1

-450.1

-407.1

-37.3

-7,392.2
-7,465.1

-9,349.4 -1,173.8
-8,877.3 -1,171.1

-4,819.7

-5,270.6

-440.8

Annual data; p = preliminary (january-february)
Source: Delgadillo (2004: 143).

Table II
Mexico’s Agricultural Balance of Trade with the United States, 1993-1998.
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

Concept

a

Agricultural Balance
Agricultural Exports
Agricultural Imports

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Annual Growth
a
(%)

- 82.0
2,472.3
2,554.3

- 776.0
2,544.6
3,320.6

1,065.1
3,539.7
2,474.7

- 1,045.4
3,119.8
4,165.2

- 409.6
3,388.5
3,798.1

- 638.0
3,570.4
4,208.4

7.62
10.5

Annual growth for period 1993-1998 = (value in 1998/value in 1993)2
Source: Cerro (2000: 414).
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Table III
Exports of Mexican Coffee Beans to the U. S. A., 1970-2003

Year

Total Exports (Kgs)
(a)

1970
83,031,192
1971
102,010,612
1972
119,233,602
1973
128,149,008
1974
135,081,775
1975
143,101,110
1976
167,788,336
1977
106,744,471
1978
114,007,611
1979
174,942,772
1980
164,375,098
1981
156,180,535
1982
160,100,759
1983
219,505,015
1984
174,036,271
1985
227,274,105
1986
208,344,349
1987
223,046,481
1988
64,358,915
1989
271,891,141
1990
209,127,935
1991
221,401,980
1992
204,588,849
1993
195,838,211
1994
178,076,885
1995
188,023,380
1996
263,867,657
1997
243,953,254
1998
226,755,621
1999
242,157,571
2000
176,247,455
2001
116,822,987
2002
113,918,857
2003
73,674,536
Source: Calculated with data from INEGI (2004).

Exports to U:S:A. (kgs)
(b)

%
c= b/a

64,149,899
77,211,831
86,599,369
96,034,863
99.312,118
102,782,650
117,246,857
80,821,096
88,522,932
117,150,267
120,011,593
124,125,534
123,535,817
135,222,956
112,546,948
164,356,756
145,118,749
166,257,362
49,060,421
233,046,596
178,987,249
180,142,564
181,302,694
173,172,685
131,593,347
149,915,644
198,469,727
170,985,329
138,701,785
179,192,033
120,623,760
78,862,815
80,403,926
51,380,622

77.26
75.69
72.63
74.94
73.52
71.82
69.88
75.71
77.65
66.96
73.01
79.47
77.16
61.60
64.67
72.32
69.65
74.54
76.23
85.71
85.59
81.36
88.62
88.43
73.90
79.73
75.21
70.90
61.17
73.99
68.44
66.37
70.58
69.74
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Table IV
Stationarity and Unitary Roots Tests
LEVELS I(0)
ADF

Variable
A

PPERRON
B

-3.636**
-1.684
Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans in Kgs. (exp)
-1.894
-1.943
International price of coffee beans (precio)
Share of coffee beans in mexican manufactures
-1.517
-1.303
(share)
-2.205
-1.927
USA per capita expenditures in coffee (gasto_pc)
-1.385
-2.172
USA per capita income (ingreso_pc)
-0.931
-1.949
Real exchange rate (tcr)
Wage rate index within the coffee sector of
0.025
-0.791
mexican manufacturing (indiceW)
-2.584
-2.345
Competitors’ exports of coffee beans (exp_comp)
FIRST DIFFERENCES I(1)
-9.850***
-6.068***
Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans in Kgs. (exp)
-6.569***
-4.016**
International price of coffee beans (precio)
Share of coffee beans in mexican manufactures -6.224 *** -4.904***
(share)
-7.125***
-3.993**
USA per capita expenditures in coffee (gasto_pc)
-3.734**
-4.863***
USA per capita income (ingreso_pc)
-2.785
-3.030
Real exchange rate (tcr)
Wage rate index within the coffee sector of
-3.273*
-2.568
mexican manufacturing (indiceW)
-6.813***
-5.370***
Competitors’ exports of coffee beans (exp_comp)
SECOND DIFFERENCES I(2)
-12.718***
-7.919***
Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans in Kgs. (exp)
-10.537***
-6.956***
International price of coffee beans (precio)
Share of coffee beans in mexican manufactures -8.932*** -7.300***
(share)
-11.526***
-6.899***
USA per capita expenditures in coffee (gasto_pc)
-5.230***
-5.660***
USA per capita income (ingreso_pc)
-5.490***
-5.935***
Real exchange rate (tcr)
Wage rate index within the coffee sector of -7.589*** -4.543***
mexican manufacturing (indiceW)
-9.286***
-7.100***
Competitors’ exports of coffee beans (exp_comp)

A= Intercept and tendency; B=Intercept, tendency and one lagg
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Source: Direct calculations

DFGLS

A

B

B

-24.62***

-22.103**

-1.971

-6.901

-6.465

-1.812

-3.904

-4.348

-1.299

-8.820

-8.072

-1.815

-2.360

-2.754

-1.746

-5.378

-3.789

-2.044

-2.404

-1.050

-1.339

-12.149

-12.688

-2.464

-43.78***

-47.86***

-5.979***

-38.38***

-37.83***

-3.860***

-33.19***

-36.25 ***

-5.059***

-41.58***

-40.85***

-3.960***

-18.662**

-23.68***

-4.935 ***

-11.936

-14.341

-3.032*

-14.707

-14.594

-2.236

-32.67***

-37.88***

-5.129***

-46.94***

-50.40***

-7.942***

-44.62***

-46.97***

-6.823***

-37.18***

-43.21***

-7.491***

-47.19***

-48.99***

-7.057***

-23.41***

-29.98***

-5.360***

-24.37***

-31.94***

-6.107***

-37.29***

-41.26***

-4.669***

-39.21***

-44.16***

-6.874***
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Table V
Maximum Likelihood Analysis for Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans,
1970-2003
(i) Cointegration Analysis
0.96325
0.1499
Eigenvalues
Ran.=0
Ran.<=1
Ran.<=2
Null Hypothesis
165.550
109.023
5.3575
Max-lambda
Max-lambda
52
46.45
40.3
critical value
283.05
117.502
8.4792
Lambda trace
Lambda trace
165.58
131.7
102.14
critical value
(ii) Standardized Vector of Cointegration and Coefficients of Adjustment
per
capita
per capita
Variable
exp price share
tcr indiceW exp_comp
Expendincome
iture
0.993

Vector 1

Vector 2

Standardized Vector
of
Cointegration (Beta)
Coeffi-cients
of
Adjustment
(Alfa)
Standardized Vector
of
Cointegration (Beta)
Coeffi-cients
of
Adjustment
(Alfa)

Variable
Weak Exogeneity
(Granger) chi-(1)

1

35.949

1.180

-31.226

-34.002

-4.973

10.357

32.963

-0.01

-0.001

-0.003

0.001

0.003

0.005

-0.003

-0.001

0.100

1

0.030

-1.037

0.065

0.074

-0.114

0.746

-2.59

-0.399

0.440

0.394

-0.099

-0.759

0.266

-0.429

(iii) Exogeneity Test for a Given Variable
price
share gasto_pc ingreso_pc tcr
1.683

0.085

2.178

P-values inside parentheses
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Source: Direct calculations

0.512

0.1338

indiceW

exp_comp

0.017

0.037
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Table VI
Regressions for the Rate of Growth of Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans to the U.S.A.

Variable or Parameter

Differences in the natural logarithm (International price of
coffee beans (precio))
Differences in the natural logarithm (Share of coffee beans in
mexican manufactures (share))
Differences in the natural logarithm of USA per capita
expenditures in coffee (gasto_pc)
Differences in the natural logarithm of USA per capita income
(ingreso_pc)
Differences in the natural logarithm of Real exchange rate (tcr)
Differences in the natural logarithm of real wage rate index
within the coffee sector of manufacturing (indiceW)
Differences in the natural logarithm o competitors’ exports of
coffee beans to the U. S. (exp_comp)
Dummy_previous (=1 from 1993 forward)
Dummy_tlc (=1 from 1994 forward)
Dummy_lagg (=1 from 1995 forward)
Dummy_acuerdos (=1 for years when an international quota
agreement existed)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Chow Test
Wald Test (dummy_tlc=0)
Heteroscedasticity (White)
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Source: Direct calculations

Differences in the
Natural Logarithm
(Mexican Exports of
Coffe Beans in Kgs.)

Robust ‘t’

-5.138

(3.67)**

0.72

(1.85)+

4.978

(3.59)**

-2.205

(1.32)

-0.324

(1.22)

-0.1

(-0.21)

-3.187

(2.54)*

0.339
1.057
-1.38

(2.06)+
(1.86)+
(2.34)*

0.327

(1.75)+

0.099

(0.86)
33
0.73
0.686
2.200
33
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Table VII
Model Vector of Correction of Errors for Mexican Exports of Coffee Beans

Variable+
Cexp-1(i)
∆export(i)t-1
∆export(i)t-2
∆preciot-1
∆preciot-2
∆share_b_manuft-1
∆ share_b_manuft-2
∆gasto_pct-1
∆ gasto_pct-2
∆ingreso_pct-1
∆ingreso_pct-2
∆tcrt-1
∆ tcrt-2
∆indice_salarialt-1
∆ indice_salarialt-2
∆export_competidorest-1
∆ export_competidorest-2
Rsquared
F-Statistic

∆Δ Mexican Exports of
Coffee Beans
0.035
0.1805
0.767
5.847
6.999
-0.321
-1.317
-5.239
-7.56
2.78
1.899
-0.516
0.432
0.377
1.741
4.851
6.973
0.1544
8.463066

Robust ‘t’
0
-0.592
-0.573
-4.415
-4.76
-0.451
(0.475)***
-4.342
-4.802
-4.081
-4.857
-0.647
-0.755
-1.153
(0.884)*
-3.687
-4.279

+See Table VI for the english equivalences of the variables
(i)
Cexp-1= ln_y - 35.949ln_p - 1.18ln_share + 31.226ln_gpc + 34.002ln_ypc + 4.973ln_tcr 10.357ln_ismM - 32.963ln_xcomp
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Source: Direct calculations
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Appendix 1
The Málaga, Williams and Fuller Model
The model consists of the following group of equations:
United States Supply of Vegetable i
(1)
UShai = f (Usfpi,t-1, UShai,t-1, USlc)
(2)
USSi = USyi x UShai
Per Capita U.S. Demand for Vegetable i
(3)
USdi = f (USrpi, USrpj, USI)
(4)
USfpi = f (USrpi)
Supply of the Mexican Exporting Sector of Vegetable i
(5)
MXXhai = f (MXbpi,t-1, MXXhai,t-1, MXlc)
(6)
MXXSi = MXXhai x MXXyi
Supply of the Mexican Domestic Sector of Vegetable i
(7)
MXDhai = f (MXbpi,t-1, MXDhai,t-1, MKlc)
(8)
MXDSi = MXDhai X MXDyi
Per Capita Mexican Demand for Vegetable i
(9)
MSdi = f (MXrpi, MXrpj, MXI)
(10)
MXrpi = f (MXbpi, RER)
Transmission Price for Vegetable i
(11)
MXbpi = f (USrpi, USTi)
Market Liberalization Conditions of the Market in Mexico/U.S. for Vegetable i
(12)
USEDi = USdi x USPOP – USSi – USMoi – USXi
(13)
MXESi = MXXSi + MXDSi – MXdi x MXPOP
(14)
USEDi = MXESi
where subscripts i y j refer to tomatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers, onions and squash. All
variables are considered for period t or for period t-1:
USdi: U.S. per capita demand; USrpi: detail price in the U. S.; USrpj: detail cross-price
in the U. S; USI: per capita U. S. income;USPOP: U. S. population;UShai: cultivated land
(acres) In the U. S;USfpi: own price in the U. S;USlc: labor cost in the U.S;USSi: U. S.
supply;USyi: U. S. productivity;MXdi: mexican per capita demand;MXrpi: detail price in
México;MXrpj; detail cross-price in Mexico; MXI: per capita income in Mexico;MXDi:
mexican per capita demand for vegetable i; MXPOP: mexican population;MXbpi: price at the
Mexico-U. S. border;RER: real Exchange rate Peso/Dollar;MXXhai: cultivated land in mexican
exporting status (acres);MXlc: labor cost in México; MXXSi: supply of the mexican exporting
states;MXXyi: productivity of mexican exporters;MXDhai: cultivated land for domestic
demand in Mexico (acres);MXDSi: mexican domestic supply;MXDyi: mexican domestic
productivity; USTi: real tariff in the U. S;USEDi: U.S. excess demand;USMoi: U. S. imports
from other countries;USXi: U. S. exports;MXESi: Mexico’s excess supply.

